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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT OSORIO TENORIO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050976-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM GUILTY PLEAS TO COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (1999), 
AND FORGERY, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-6-405 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG PRESIDING 
JOSIE E. BRUMFIELD 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
RICHARD G. HAMP 
Assistant Attorney General 
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February 9, 2007 
Lisa Collins 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84114-0230 
-7fc> 
Re: State v. Tenorio, Case No. 20050967<CA 
Oral argument set: February 15, 2007 
Dear Ms. Collins, 
This letter is offered pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
After the State filed its brief on July 31, 2006, this Court issued the following decisions, 
State v. Briggs, 2006 UT App 448, ^  6, 147 P.3d 969; State v. Canchola-Rodriguez, 2006 
UT App 481U; State v. Johns, 2006 UT App 499U; and State v. Serrano, 2007 UT App 
28U—all of which are relevant to the State's argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider defendant's claims. See Aple. Br. at 8-27. 
A copy of each of these decisions is attached for the Court's convenience. 
Respectfully submitted, 
&• Plue^uk 
Karen A. Klucznik / 
Assistant Attorney General 
encl. 
cc: Joan C. Watt, Attorney for Appellant (w/ encl.) 
Westlaw 
147P.3d969 
147 P.3d 969, 564 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2006 UT App 448 
(Cite as: 147P.3d969) 
C 
State v. BriggsUtah App.,2006. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Brandon James BRIGGS, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20050734-CA. 
Nov. 2, 2006. 
Background: Defendant was convicted on guilty 
plea in the Second District Court Farmington 
Department, Darwin C. Hansen, J., of drug charge. 
Defendant appealed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, 
Associate P.J., held that Court of Appeals lacked 
jurisdiction to consider post-sentence claim of 
ineffective assistance of plea counsel. 
Affirmed in part; appeal dismissed in part. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law 110 €^>1031(4) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110k 1031 In Preliminary Proceedings 
110k 1031(4) k. Arraignment and 
Plea. Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €^1043(2) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110k 1043 Scope and Effect of 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
Page 1 
Objection 
&#xa0; 110kl043(2) k. Necessity of 
Specific Objection. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant failed to preserve for review on direct 
appeal claim that trial court should have inquired 
into counsel's reference to State's violation of plea 
agreement, where defendant did not state legal basis 
for objection or request specific relief. 
[2] Criminal Law 110 €^>1028 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110kl028 k. Presentation of Questions 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal. 
[3] Criminal Law 110 €^1043(2) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110kl043 Scope and Effect of 
Objection 
110kl043(2) k. Necessity of 
Specific Objection. Most Cited Cases 
In order to preserve an objection for appellate 
review, specific objections are required in order to 
bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention 
and to give the court an opportunity to correct the 
errors if appropriate. 
[4] Criminal Law 110 €^1031(4) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
147P.3d969 
147 P.3d 969, 564 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2006 UT App 448 
(Cite as: 147 P.3d 969) 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110kl031 In Preliminary Proceedings 
11 Ok 1031(4) k. Arraignment and 
Plea. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant was not entitled to appellate review of 
claim that trial court should have inquired into 
counsel's reference to state's breach of plea 
agreement at sentencing for drug charge, where 
defendant did not argue plain error or exceptional 
circumstances on appeal. 
[5] Criminal Law 110 €^1030(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110kl030 Necessity of Objections in 
General 
110kl030(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
If a defendant fails to make a proper objection to 
the trial court, a reviewing court may consider an 
issue on appeal if the defendant establishes that 
plain error occurred or exceptional circumstances 
exist. 
[6] Criminal Law 110 €=>1044.1(2) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110k 1044 Motion Presenting Objection 
110kl044.1 In General; Necessity 
of Motion 
110kl044.1(2) k. Preliminary 
Proceedings; Indictment, Information, or 
Complaint. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's failure to file motion to withdraw guilty 
plea to drug charge prior to sentencing precluded 
review on direct appeal of claim of ineffective 
assistance of plea counsel; rather, defendant's 
remedy was to file motion for postconviction relief. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; West's U.C.A. § 
77-13-6(2); Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65C. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
Page 2 
*969 Scott L. Wiggins, Arnold & Wiggins, PC, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and Brett J. 
DelPorto, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, ORME, and 
THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
If 1 Defendant Brandon James Briggs appeals his 
conviction on a drug charge after pleading guilty. 
First, Defendant argues that he is entitled to 
withdraw his guilty plea because the sentencing 
court failed to inquire into his comment that the 
State may have breached the plea agreement. 
Second, Defendant asserts that this court should 
allow him to withdraw his guilty plea because his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to withdraw the plea. We do not address 
the merits of either of Defendant's claims. 
Defendant failed to preserve the first claim in the 
trial court, and he does not argue plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appeal. See State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1 H, 10 P.3d 346. 
Furthermore, this court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider Defendant's second claim. See State v. 
Reyes, 2002 UT 13,1 3, 40 P.3d 630. 
1 2 Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, 
Defendant pleaded guilty as charged. *970 The 
agreement provided: "Defendant to plead as 
charged, State will stipulate to a double 402 per 
statute if defendant is granted and completes 
probation without any violations; otherwise silent 
on sentencing." After accepting the plea, the trial 
court set a date for sentencing and ordered Adult 
Probation and Parole (AP & P) to complete a 
presentence investigation report. 
1 3 At sentencing, AP & P recommended prison. 
Defendant's trial counsel argued that instead of 
prison, Defendant should be given probation so that 
he could have the opportunity to be screened for 
and accepted by the Job Corps Program (Job 
Corps). The State responded by arguing 
extensively that Job Corps was inappropriate. 
Defendant's trial counsel then stated: "I guess for 
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
147 P.3d 969 
147 P.3d 969, 564 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2006 UT App 448 
(Cite as: 147 P.3d 969) 
the record I would object to the State's comments. 
I think under the circumstances where there [are] 
two alternatives on the table, I think speaking 
against [J]ob [C]orp[s] and the other comment is 
essentially a back-door recommendation for prison, 
[in] violation of the plea agreement." The court 
then made some additional comments, and 
sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of 
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
[1][2][3] | 4 Defendant argues that the trial court 
should have conducted a detailed inquiry into his 
objection that the prosecutor may have breached the 
plea agreement. We believe this argument was not 
adequately preserved for appeal. "As a general 
rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not 
be raised on appeal." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at \ 
11, 10 P.3d 346. "Utah courts require specific 
objections in order 'to bring all claimed errors to 
the trial court's attention to give the court an 
opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.' " 
State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,^ 14, 54 P.3d 
645 (quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 
(Utah Ct.App.1993)). Although Defendant brought 
the alleged violation of the plea agreement to the 
court's attention, by failing to state a legal basis for 
his objection or request any specific relief, 
Defendant did not "give the court an opportunity to 
correct the error[ ]." Id.; see also Brown, 856 P.2d 
at 361 ("An oblique reference to an issue in the 
absence of an 'objection to the trial court's failure 
to rule on the issue' does not put that issue properly 
before the court." (quoting LeBaron & Assocs. v. 
Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991))). At the very least, for purposes of 
preservation, Defendant needed to specify the 
alleged error and provide a legal justification to 
support his argument so that the trial court could " 
assess [the] allegations ... and consider[ ] them in 
the context of the specific legal doctrine placed at 
issue." Hardy, 2002 UT App 244 at f 15, 54 P.3d 
645 (quotations and citation omitted). Because 
Defendant failed to articulate a proper objection, 
this issue has not been preserved. 
[4] [5] f 5 Moreover, Defendant does not argue 
plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. 
If a defendant fails to make a proper objection to 
the trial court, a reviewing court may consider an 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No CI 
issue on appeal if the defendant establishes that 
plain error occurred or exceptional circumstances 
exist. See, e.g., State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49,K 
18, 122 P.3d 566 (imposing burden of establishing 
plain error or exceptional circumstances on 
appellant). In this instance, Defendant fails to 
argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on 
appeal. Therefore, this court will not address the 
merits of his claim that the trial court should have 
inquired into his objection. 
[6] K 6 Further, because Defendant failed to timely 
file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, this court 
lacks jurisdiction to consider his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. Utah Code section 
77-13-6(2) states that a defendant is required to file 
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea "before 
sentence is announced.... Any challenge to a guilty 
plea not made [before sentence is announced] shall 
be pursued under ... [the] Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act, and Rule 65C[ of the] Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b), 
(c) (Supp.2006); see also id. §§ 78-35a-101 to -304 
(2002 & Supp.2006); Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. Under 
section 77-13-6(2), if a motion to withdraw a plea is 
not timely filed, this court does not have jurisdiction 
to review the plea, even on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6(2)(b); see also State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 
If 3, 40 P.3d 630; *971 State v. Melo, 2001 UT 
App 392,KU 4, 8-9, 40 P.3d 646. Because 
Defendant did not file a timely motion to withdraw 
his plea, this court lacks jurisdiction to review it on 
direct appeal. Therefore, Defendant's only 
remaining option is to raise this claim under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act and rule 65C of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 77-13-6(2), 78-35a-101 to -304; Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65C. 
K 7 In sum, we do not address Defendant's claim 
that the trial court should have conducted a more 
detailed inquiry into his objection because 
Defendant failed to adequately preserve the issue in 
the trial court, and he does not argue plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appeal. Moreover, 
this court does not have jurisdiction to consider 
Defendant's claim that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion to withdraw 
toOrig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
147P.3d969 Page 4 
147 P.3d 969, 564 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,2006 UT App 448 
(Cite as: 147 P.3d 969) 
the plea. 
1 8 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, 
Judge, and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judge. 
Utah App.,2006. 
State v. Briggs 
147 P.3d 969, 564 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2006 UT 
App 448 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Westlaw 
Not Reported in P.3d 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 3518254 (Utah App.), 
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d) 
State v. Canchola-RodriguezUtah App.,2006. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ricardo CANCHOLA-RODRIGUEZ, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 20060896-CA. 
Dec. 7, 2006. 
Second District, Farmington Department, 
051701664; The Honorable Darwin C. Hansen. 
Joseph Jardine, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, BILLINGS, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication). 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Ricardo Canchola-Rodriguez appeals from his 
convictions on three felony charges after pleading 
guilty. This is before the court on its own motion 
for summary disposition based on lack of a 
substantial question for review and on 
Canchola-Rodriguez's motion for remand pursuant 
to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B. 
Although Canchola-Rodriguez pleaded guilty and 
seeks to attack those pleas on appeal, albeit on a 
theory of ineffective assistance of counsel, he did 
not file a motion to withdraw his pleas in the district 
court. His failure to timely file a motion to 
withdraw his pleas bars this court from considering 
his challenge to the validity of his pleas on appeal. 
Pursuant to Utah Code section 77-13-6, a request to 
withdraw a guilty plea must be made by a motion 
Page 1 
UT App 481 
filed prior to sentencing. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6(2)(b) (2003). The failure to timely file a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea "extinguishes a 
defendant's right to challenge the validity of the 
guilty plea on appeal." State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 
\ 3, 40 P.3d 630; see also State v. Merrill, 2005 
UT 34, 114 P.3d 585 (holding the time limit in 
section 77-13-6 is jurisdictional). Absent a timely 
motion to withdraw a plea, appellate courts lack 
jurisdiction to consider any issue attacking the 
guilty plea itself, including whether a defendant 
received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
entering the plea agreement. See State v. Briggs, 
2006 UT App 448,H 6. Because 
Canchola-Rodriguez failed to timely move to 
withdraw his guilty pleas, this court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider his claim that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with 
his pleas. He has not raised any other issue that this 
court may review. 
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, based on the dismissal, 
Canchola-Rodriguez's motion for remand is denied 
as moot. 
Utah App.,2006. 
State v. Canchola-Rodriguez 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 3518254 (Utah 
App.), 2006 UT App 481 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Westlaw 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 1 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 3647895 (Utah App.), 2006 UT App 499 
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d) 
State v. JohnsUtah App.,2006. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Randall K. JOHNS, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20050746-CA. 
Dec. 14,2006. 
Second District, Ogden Department, 041903027; 
The Honorable Michael D. Lyon. 
Randall W. Richards, Ogden, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, DAVIS, and ORME 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
ORME, Judge: 
*1 We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal 
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs 
and record[,] and the decisional process would not 
be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah 
R.App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented 
are readily resolved under applicable law. 
Defendant argues he was denied effective assistance 
of counsel because his trial counsel did not move to 
disallow Defendant's plea based on Defendant's 
incompetence. But "if a motion to withdraw a plea 
is not timely filed, this court does not have 
jurisdiction to review the plea, even on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Briggs, 
2006 UT App 448,1f 6. Because no motion to 
withdraw the plea was filed in the instant case, we 
do not have jurisdiction over this appeal. " 
Therefore, Defendant's only remaining option is to 
raise this claim under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." Id. Accord Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6(2)(c)(Supp.2006). 
Defendant additionally argues that it was plain error 
for the trial court to fail to rule, sua sponte, that 
Defendant was incompetent at the time he entered 
his plea. This argument is misplaced because the 
issue here is one of jurisdiction and not of 
preservation. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, If 4, 
40 P.3d 630. "This court may choose to review an 
issue not properly preserved for plain error. It 
cannot, however, use plain error to reach an issue 
over which it has no jurisdiction." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
Accordingly, we dismiss Defendant's appeal. Given 
our lack of jurisdiction over this appeal, any 
correction of the sentencing error alleged by the 
State will need to be effected through other means. 
WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Associate Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS, 
Judge. 
Utah App.,2006. 
State v. Johns 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 3647895 (Utah 
App.), 2006 UT App 499 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Not Reported m P 3d Page 1 
Not Reported in P 3d, 2007 WL 274760 (Utah App), 2007 UT App 28 
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d) 
State v SerranoUtah App ,2007 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
John Pres SERRANO, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 20060132-CA. 
Feb 1,2007 
Seventh District, Castle Dale Department, 
051700111, The Honorable Bruce K Halliday 
Samuel S Bailey, Price, for Appellant 
Mark L Shurtleff and Kris C Leonard, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges BENCH, McHUGH, and THORNE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM 
*1 This matter is before the court on John Pres 
Serrano's rule 23 B motion to remand the case for 
additional findmgs and the State's motion for 
summary disposition 
Serrano entered into a plea agreement with the 
State As a result, on November 1, 2005, he pleaded 
guilty to one count of aggravated assault and one 
count of driving under the influence Serrano never 
filed a motion to withdraw his plea prior to 
sentencing On November 8, 2006, the district court 
sentenced Serrano to an indeterminate term of 
zero-to-five years in prison The judgment, 
sentence, and commitment were entered on 
February 13,2006 
In order to challenge the validity of a guilty plea, a 
defendant must first file a motion to withdraw his 
plea before the sentence is announced See Utah 
Code Ann § 77-13-6 (Supp 2006), see also State v 
Merrill 2005 UT 34/||f 13-20, 114 P 3d 585 
Absent a timely filed motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea, this court does not have jurisdiction on a 
direct appeal to review the validity of the plea See 
Merrill 2005 UT 34 at 1fl[ 13-20, see also Utah 
Code Ann § 77-13-6(2)(c) ("Any challenge to a 
guilty plea not made within the time period 
specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued 
under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure ") This includes the ability to challenge 
the plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of 
counsel See Merrill 2005 UT 34 at 1fl[ 17-19, 
see also State v Briggs 2006 UT App 448,1 6, 
149 P3d 969, State v Melo 2001 UT App 392,1 
9, 40 P 3d 646 
Serrano has cited two issues on appeal Serrano first 
claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because 
counsel implied that if Serrano pleaded guilty, he 
would spend no more than six months in the local 
jail Second, Serrano argues that the district court 
failed to effectively inform Serrano of his right to 
withdraw his plea as required by rule 11(e)(7) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Because both 
issues relate to the validity of the plea, this court 
does not have jurisdiction to review the issues See 
Merrill 2005 UT 34 at If 20 If Serrano seeks to 
challenge the validity of his plea he must do so 
pursuant to Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(c) FN1 
FN1 Because this court does not have 
jurisdiction to review the validity of 
Serrano's claim that his trial counsel was 
ineffective, Serrano's rule 23B motion to 
remand the case to the district court for 
additional findings of fact is necessarily 
denied 
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal 
Utah App ,2007 
© 2007 Thomson/West No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 2 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 274760 (Utah App.), 2007 UT App 28 
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d) 
State v. Serrano 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 274760 (Utah 
App.), 2007 UT App 28 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
STATE OF U T A H 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL F I L E D 
<TOx U T A H APPELLATE COURTS 
$Stfftfa\ JAN 2 5 2007 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RAYMOND A. H.NTZE Protecting Utah • Protecting You K.RK TORGENSEN 
Chief Deputy d ® Chief Deputy 
January 25, 2007 
Lisa Collins 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84114-0230 
Re: State v. Tenorio, Case No. 20e5096^CA 
Oral argument set: February 15, 2007 
Dear Ms. Collins, 
This letter is offered pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
After the State filed its brief on July 31, 2006, the Utah Supreme Court decided State v. 
Norris, 2007 UT 5, P.3d , and Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT 11. Also after the 
State filed its brief, this Court decided State v. Hudson, 2007 UT App 23U. 
Grimmett and Hudson are relevant to the State's argument that this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider defendant's claims. See Aple. Br. at 8-27. Norris is relevant to 
the State's argument that defendant waived any right to appeal his convictions or to 
challenge the jurisdictional nature of the plea withdrawal statute when he entered his 
guilty plea. See Aple. Br. at 17-27. 
A copy of each of these decisions is attached for the Court's convenience. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Karen A. Klucznik ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
end. 
cc: Joan C. Watt, Attorney for Appellant (w/ encl.) 
2 0 0 7 UT 5 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, No. 20040880 
Plaintiff, Respondent, 
and Cross-Petitioner, 
v. 
Richard F. Norris, 
Defendant, Petitioner, 
and Cross-Respondent. 
Fourth District, Provo Dep't 
The Honorable James R. Taylor 
No. 981403794 
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., E. Neal Gunnarson, 
Jeffrey S. Gray, Christine F. Soltis, Asst, 
Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
Jennifer K. Gowans, Provo, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice: 
^1 The defendant, Richard Norris, challenges the 
constitutionality of the Communications Fraud statute, Utah Code 
section 76-10-1801, as overbroad. Specifically, he seeks review 
of the decision of the court of appeals holding that the statute 
is constitutional. 
%2 The State cross-petitions, seeking reversal of the 
decision of the court of appeals that an unconditional guilty 
plea does not waive a defendant's appellate challenge to the 
facial constitutionality of the statute under which the defendant 
was charged.1 
F I L E D 
January 19, 2007 
1
 State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, 97 P.3d 732. 
t3 Because we reverse, holding that an unconditional 
guilty plea does waive a defendant's right to challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute, we do not reach the other issues 
presented. 
f4 Review of the specific facts leading to the charges 
against the defendant are not necessary for the resolution of 
this matter. The defendant was originally charged with seven 
counts of communications fraud. The State amended the 
information, and the defendant was ultimately tried on five 
counts of communications fraud. 
%5 After three days of trial, the defendant elected to 
change his plea and entered an unconditional guilty plea to three 
counts of communications fraud. All are third degree felonies. 
f6 The defendant made no attempt to withdraw his 
unconditional guilty plea. He did, however, timely file an 
appeal. The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the convictions. We 
granted certiorari to review the correctness of that action. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%7 On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals and not the decision of the trial court.2 "The 
determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction 
is a question of law, which we review for correctness."3 
ANALYSIS 
f8 In order to reach the issues of overbreadth and 
vagueness, the court of appeals initially addressed the question 
of whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to review the 
conviction on appeal once the defendant had entered an 
unconditional guilty plea. The court of appeals4 found that a 
facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is 
jurisdictional in nature and that, therefore, an unconditional 
2
 State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
3
 Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, ^ 8, 31 P.3d 
1147. 
4
 Each of the court of appeals judges who sat on the panel 
wrote his own separate opinion. The majority felt that a 
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute could not be 
waived. The remaining judge felt that this could be waived and 
that subject matter jurisdiction was therefore lacking. 
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guilty plea could not act as a waiver or bar to raising this 
claim for the first time on appeal. We disagree, 
f9 An unconditional guilty plea waives any right the 
defendant may have had to challenge the basis of his conviction 
on its merits. The defendant's effort to describe the 
constitutional challenge he raises as a challenge to the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the district court is simply without merit 
as a tool for appealing the conviction after the plea has been 
entered and the sentence imposed. The court of appeals lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The opinion of the court 
of appeals is vacated, and the judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
KlO Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, 
and Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins' 
opinion. 
3 No. 20040880 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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PARRISH, Justice; 
%1 Plaintiff Adolph Grimmett appeals from a denial of his 
motion to withdraw several guilty pleas. The question raised by 
this appeal stems from the intersection of the nunc pro tunc 
resentencing remedy we outlined in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 
38 (Utah 1981), and Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b), which 
establishes the time limitations governing motions to withdraw. 
More specifically, we must determine whether a resentencing order 
under Johnson extends the time during which a defendant may file 
a motion to withdraw under section 77-13-6(2)(b). We conclude 
that it does not and thus affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
^2 In December 2002, Grimmett was charged by information 
with aggravated kidnapping, attempted automobile theft, assault, 
and public intoxication. The charges arose from an incident at 
the University of Utah during which Grimmett attacked a woman as 
she was getting into her car. Grimmett's appointed counsel, 
F I L E D 
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Robin Ljungberg, advised Grimmett that his ethnicity would 
negatively affect his chances at trial. Ljungberg also stated 
that the high-profile Elizabeth Smart case "would have an impact 
on the jury." Grimmett followed Ljungberg's advice and pled 
guilty to a reduced charge of attempted aggravated robbery, 
attempted theft, and assault. The district court entered a final 
judgment in March 2003 and sentenced Grimmett to consecutive 
prison terms of varying lengths. 
%3 Several months later, Grimmett began writing letters to 
the district court complaining that Ljungberg had neither filed 
an appeal nor moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, despite his 
requests that Ljungberg do so. Ljungberg confirmed the truth of 
these allegations, but the district court informed Grimmett that 
it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the sentence and advised him 
to appeal. The district court treated Grimmett's fourth letter 
as a notice of appeal. The court of appeals subsequently 
dismissed the appeal in July 2004, citing its untimeliness. 
State v. Grimmett, 2 0 04 UT App 235U. 
f4 In June 2 004, two weeks before the court of appeals 
dismissed Grimmett's appeal, his newly appointed counsel filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act (the "PCRA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -110 
(2002 & Supp. 2006), and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In his petition, Grimmett sought resentencing and 
alternatively moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that 
they had been involuntary. 
^5 The State responded to Grimmett's post-conviction 
petition by agreeing that he should be resentenced nunc pro tunc 
pursuant to our decision in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 
(Utah 1981), thereby restoring his right to appeal. In January 
2005, the district court ordered that Grimmett be resentenced. 
Subsequent to the district court's resentencing order but prior 
to the actual resentencing, Grimmett filed a motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas or, in the alternative, to reduce the degrees of 
the offenses prior to being resentenced. The district court 
denied the motion and instead resentenced Grimmett nunc pro tunc, 
ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Grimmett's motion 
to withdraw his pleas. 
f6 Grimmett filed a timely appeal. He subsequently filed 
a motion with the court of appeals asking that it either 
summarily reverse his convictions or order a remand hearing on 
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under rule 23B of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court of appeals denied 
the motion and certified the appeal for transfer to this court. 
We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78-2-2(3) (b) . 
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ANALYSIS 
%7 This appeal requires that we determine whether a 
defendant timely files a motion to withdraw his guilty plea under 
Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b) when the motion is filed after 
the district court has ordered that the defendant be resentenced 
but before the actual resentencing. Stated differently, the 
question before us is whether the application of the Johnson nunc 
pro tunc resentencing remedy permits a defendant to withdraw his 
guilty pleas under Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b) , which 
requires that a motion to withdraw a plea be made before 
sentencing. We conclude that Grimmett's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea was untimely and thus affirm the district court's 
denial of Grimmett's motion to withdraw. 
%S Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b) establishes the filing 
limitations that govern a criminal defendant's right to withdraw 
a guilty plea. These filing limitations are jurisdictional. 
State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, % 20, 114 P.3d 585. Section 
77-13-6(2)(b) "imposes a jurisdictional bar on late-filed motions 
to withdraw guilty pleas," id. % 17, and failure to comply with 
its requirements *extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge 
the validity of the guilty plea on appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002 
UT 13, f 3, 40 P.3d 630. Grimmett must therefore comply with the 
requirements of section 77-13-6(2)(b) if he seeks to challenge 
the validity of his guilty pleas on appeal. See Manning v. 
State, 2005 UT 61, f 36, 122 P.3d 628 ("Any challenge to [a 
guilty plea] may only be undertaken following a timely motion for 
withdrawal of the guilty plea."). 
^9 Grimmett contends that his January 2 0 05 motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas met the jurisdictional requirements of 
section 77-13-6(2) (b), despite the fact that it was filed twenty-
two months after his sentencing. Because section 77-13-6(2) (b) 
underwent substantial revision in May 2 003 and the parties 
disagree about which version of the statute controls, we review 
both versions and conclude that Grimmett's challenge fails under 
both. 
I. THE 1989 VERSION OF UTAH CODE SECTION 77-13-6(2)(B) 
HlO The prior version of section 77-13-6(2) (b) , which was 
first adopted by the legislature in 1989 and remained in effect 
at the time of Grimmett's original March 2003 sentencing, reads 
as follows: "A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest is made by motion and shall be made within 3 0 days after 
the entry of the plea" (emphasis added). Grimmett's motion, 
filed almost two years after the entry of his guilty plea, 
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clearly fails to meet the thirty-day jurisdictional requirement 
of the 1989 statute. Grimmett nevertheless argues that we should 
excuse his noncompliance, noting our statement that a 
"presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, 
be liberally granted." State v. Galleaos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042 
(Utah 1987). Galleaos is unavailing here, however, for two 
reasons. 
Ull First, Grimmett's January 2005 motion to withdraw was 
not a "presentence motion," as it was filed twenty-two months 
after the announcement of his sentence. Second, and more 
importantly, we made the statement on which Grimmett relies while 
reviewing the 1980 version of section 77-13-6, which imposed no 
jurisdictional time limitations on motions to withdraw. That 
version read: UA plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn 
only upon good cause shown and with leave of court." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) (amended 1989 & 2003); see also State v. 
Abevta, 852 P.2d 993, 994-96 (Utah 1993) (applying the 1980 
version of the statute and holding that it potentially allowed a 
criminal defendant to withdraw a guilty plea almost three years 
after sentencing). 
J^l2 Section 77-13-6, however, was amended by the 
legislature in 1989 to impose a strict jurisdictional time limit. 
Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (b) (1995) (amended 2003) (UA 
request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 3 0 days after the entry of the 
plea."); see also Abevta, 852 P.2d at 955. While courts may 
still "liberally grant" presentence motions to withdraw a guilty 
plea, they may now do so only if they have jurisdiction. Under 
the 1989 version of section 77-13-6(2)(b), the district court had 
none. 
II. THE 2003 VERSION OF UTAH CODE SECTION 77-13-6(2) (B) 
fl3 We now consider Grimmett's arguments within the context 
of the 2003 version of section 77-13-6(2)(b). In doing so, we 
find that the Johnson resentencing remedy is limited in nature 
and purpose and does not allow Grimmett "another opportunity to 
present postconviction motions." State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 
356 (Utah 1996) . 
A. Background 
1[14 Two months after Grimmett's original March 2003 
sentencing, the legislature amended section 77-13-6(2) (b) to 
remove the thirty-day limit and instead require that criminal 
defendants file withdrawal motions before sentencing. As 
amended, the statute reads: "A request to withdraw a plea of 
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guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in abeyance, shall 
be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not 
be announced unless the motion is denied." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-6(2)(b) (2003) (emphasis added). 
fl5 The legislature apparently enacted this amendment in 
response to our decision in State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 
528. In Ostler, we interpreted the phrase "30 days after the 
entry of the plea" to refer to the date of entry of final 
judgment, not to the date of the plea colloquy. Id. K 11. We 
reasoned that substantial unfairness might result from a plain-
language reading of the 1989 statute: * [T]o start the time for 
moving to withdraw a plea from the time the district court 
accepted a plea could 'deprive the district court of the power to 
review a plea before it enters a judgment of conviction and 
sentence,' an outcome we found to be unreasonably unfair." 
Merrill, 2005 UT 34, f 16 (quoting Ostler, 2001 UT 68, K 10). 
Hl6 The 2003 amendment to section 77-13-6(2) (b) both 
embraced and repudiated Ostler. It embraced Ostler7 s recognition 
that it would be unfair to prevent criminal defendants from 
moving to withdraw a guilty plea at any time before their 
sentencing. CJL. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2003). It 
repudiated Ostler, however, by setting sentencing as the deadline 
for filing such motions. Under Ostler, a criminal defendant had 
thirty days from nthe date of final disposition of the case" to 
file a motion to withdraw. 2001 UT 68, H 11. The 2003 amendment 
eliminates this possibility and instead mandates that any motion 
to withdraw a plea be filed before sentence is announced. 
B. The Limited Nature and Purpose of the 
Nunc Pro Tunc Resentencing Remedy 
Ul7 In Grimmett's view, the district court's January 2005 
order that he be resentenced nunc pro tunc reopened the section 
77-13-6(2) (b) time frame and permitted him to file a motion to 
withdraw at any time before the actual resentencing. In other 
words, Grimmett reads the term "sentence" in the 2003 statute as 
including a "resentence." He thus reads the 2003 statute as 
meaning that w[a] request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest, except for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by 
motion before sentence [or resentence] is announced." We reject 
this interpretation. 
fl8 In State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), we 
instructed district courts to resentence criminal defendants nunc 
pro tunc when those defendants were prevented from bringing 
timely appeals through no fault of their own. Under Johnson, 
nunc pro tunc resentencing restarted the appeal clock and 
5 No. 20050143 
provided defendants with an opportunity to bring direct appeals 
of their convictions. Id. The Johnson nunc pro tunc 
resentencing regime stood until our decision in Manning v. State, 
2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628, which was decided about two weeks 
before Grimmett filed his initial brief in this case. 
1(19 In Manning, we discarded nunc pro tunc resentencing in 
light of the 1996 enactment of the PCRA, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-35a-101 to -110 (2002 & Supp. 2006), and corresponding 
revisions to rules 65B and 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. We concluded that "resentencing [was] no longer a 
preferred remedy," in part because "resentencing tends to create 
more problems than it resolves." Manning, 2 005 UT 61, |^ 28 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Grimmett's case 
nicely illustrates the problematic nature of the Johnson remedy. 
^2 0 Our opinion in Manning made clear that "the Johnson 
remedy was ultimately designed to restore a denied right to 
appeal." Id. Our decisions in both Manning and Johnson were 
fashioned to address a single, key constitutional concern: " [W]e 
must provide a readily accessible and procedurally simple method 
by which persons improperly denied their right to appeal can 
promptly exercise this right." Id. ^ 26; accord Johnson, 635 
P.2d at 38 (w[If a] defendant was denied a constitutional right 
[to a timely appeal, he] must be provided an opportunity to take 
a direct appeal from his conviction."). Johnson and its progeny 
thus established the limited scope and purpose of the nunc pro 
tunc resentencing remedy. 
f21 Our decision in State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350 (Utah 
1996), affirms the limited scope of the Johnson remedy. In 
Gordon, a criminal defendant who had been resentenced nunc pro 
tunc moved for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. Id. at 353. 
This court explained that the motion for a new trial was 
untimely: 
The only effect of the [resentencing] order 
was to provide [the defendant] with another 
opportunity to pursue the direct appeal that 
he was previously denied. In other words, 
[the defendant's] resentencing merely 
returned him to the position he was in before 
his appeal was dismissed. It did not allow 
him another opportunity to present 
postconviction motions. 
Id. at 356 (emphasis added). 
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[^22 Gordon relied in part on our decision in State v. 
Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993), in which we explained 
that Mo]nee a trial court on habeas review determines that a 
defendant has been denied the constitutional right to appeal, a 
direct appeal should be provided immediately, without 
adjudication of any other claims, such as ineffective assistance 
of counsel" (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Thus, Gordon 
and Hallett both illustrate that nunc pro tunc resentencing is a 
limited remedy designed to reinstate the crucial constitutional 
right to appeal. In both cases, we expressly rejected the view 
that the reinstatement of the right to appeal opened the door for 
the consideration of post-conviction motions. 
%23 The 2003 amendment to section 77-13-6(2)(b) did not 
undercut our reasoning in Gordon. Under the 1989 statute, a 
defendant was required to move to withdraw his plea "within 3 0 
days after the entry of the [final judgment]." See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6 (2) (b) (1995) (amended 2003); see also Ostler, 2001 
UT 68, H 11. This time frame was changed by the 2003 statute, 
which required that the motion be filed "before sentence is 
announced." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (b) (2003). Though this 
change is not insignificant, it does not render Gordon 
inapplicable. Our holding in Gordon did not hinge on the thirty-
day deadline imposed by the 1989 statute; it was based instead on 
the limited scope and purpose of the nunc pro tunc resentencing 
remedy. We fail to see how modification of the statutory 
deadline bears on either the nature or the scope of the nunc pro 
tunc resentencing remedy. 
[^24 We therefore conclude that the district court's January 
2 005 resentencing order did not reopen the filing window 
established by section 77-13-6(2)(b). We expressly hold that the 
Johnson nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy, which is no longer 
available to criminal defendants, Manning, 2005 UT 61, K 11, does 
not permit a criminal defendant to file a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea after the jurisdictional deadline established by 
section 77-13-6(2)(b). 
[^25 Because Grimmett's motion to withdraw was untimely 
under both versions of section 77-13-6(2) (b) , we have no 
jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the validity of his 
guilty pleas. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ^ 3, 40 P.3d 630 
(MB]ecause [the defendant] did not move to withdraw his guilty 
plea within thirty days after the entry of the plea, we lack 
jurisdiction to address [his challenge to his guilty plea] on 
appeal."). 
[^26 Our decision today does not leave Grimmett without a 
remedy, however. Section 77-13-6(2) (c) (2003) expressly states 
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that an untimely challenge to a guilty plea "shall be pursued 
under" the PCRA and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.1 We further note that should Grimmett avail himself 
of this remedy, he may be "appoint[ed] counsel on a pro bono 
basis," Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-109(1) (2002). But see Hutchings 
v. State, 2003 UT 52, ] 20, 84 P.3d 1150 (stating that defendants 
have "no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in a civil 
petition for post-conviction relief"). Given the circumstances 
that have led him to this point and the fact that the merits of 
his argument have not yet been addressed, Grimmett appears to be 
a prime candidate to benefit from the district court's discretion 
to appoint counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
i|27 We affirm the district court's denial of Grimmett's 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and hold that the Johnson 
nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy does not permit him a second 
bite at the apple under Utah Code section 77-13-6(2) (b) . Because 
Grimmett did not file a timely motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas, we have no jurisdiction to consider his attack on their 
validity. Affirmed. 
f28 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, 
Justice Durrant, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish's 
opinion. 
1
 Grimmett has already petitioned for post-conviction 
relief once, in June 2004. The State responded to that petition 
by "erroneously indicat [ing] . . . that a challenge to 
defendant's guilty pleas could be made on direct appeal through a 
23B remand hearing." The State has indicated in its brief that 
because of its error, it will "not move to dismiss a petition 
challenging the validity of [Grimmett's] pleas as successive." 
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PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Clifford Hudson appeals both his conviction 
following a guilty plea to criminal non-support, a third degree 
felony, and his sentence. 
"A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest . . . 
shall be made by motion before sentence is announced." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (b) (Supp. 2006) . Hudson did not move to 
withdraw his guilty plea prior to the announcement of sentence. 
He argues that the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel prevented 
him from filing a timely motion to withdraw and he should be 
allowed to develop that claim on appeal. However, failure to 
file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea "extinguishes a 
defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea on 
appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,1(3, 40 P.3d 630, including a 
challenge to the guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See State v. Briggs, 2006 UT App 448,^6, 147 P.3d 969 
("[B]ecause Defendant failed to timely file a motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim."). Absent a timely 
motion to withdraw, we lack jurisdiction to consider whether a 
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
connection with entry of a guilty plea. See id.; see also State 
v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,^17-20, 114 P.3d 585 (confirming that the 
time limit in section 77-13-6 is jurisdictional). Any challenge 
to a guilty plea not raised in a timely motion to withdraw must 
be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and rule 65C of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-
6(2) (c) . 
"A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the 
trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all 
legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds 
legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Hudson's sentence is within the statutory 
range for a third degree felony, i.e., an indeterminate prison 
term of zero-to-five years and a $5000 fine suspended upon 
successful completion of probation. The court placed Hudson on 
"thirty-six months probation to be extended until the entire 
amount of restitution is [paid] in full," and required him to 
serve 3 65 days in jail. The court required him to pay 
restitution for his past due child support in the amount of 
$118,483.72 as of August 2006, as incorporated in the plea 
agreement. Utah Code section 76-3-201(4)(a) requires a court to 
order restitution "for conduct for which the defendant has agreed 
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-201(4)(a) (Supp. 2006); see also id. § 77-38a-302(12) 
(Supp. 2006) (requiring court to order restitution "for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as a part 
of a plea bargain"). The court ordered Hudson to make payments 
of $2000 per month to be applied to his ongoing child support and 
restitution beginning thirty days after his release from jail. 
His claim that the monthly amount due under the sentencing order 
was $4000 is incorrect. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in requiring Hudson to pay restitution. 
Hudson claims that the district court abused its discretion 
by continuing probation until restitution is paid. He contends 
that the court sentenced him "to a period of probation far in 
excess of the time allowed by law, of 36 months." See id. § 77-
18-1(10) (a) (i) (Supp. 2006) . However, the Utah Supreme Court 
recently held that Utah Code section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) "does not 
impose any limitation on the length of probationary term that a 
court may impose" and that "the Utah Code imposes no statutory 
time limitation on probation." State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 
86,^13,16, 567 Utah Adv. Rep. 41. In addition, a court may make 
payment of victim restitution a condition of probation. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8)(a)(ix). Restitution payment may be 
enforced through continuation of probation or through contempt 
proceedings based upon failure to pay restitution. See State v. 
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Nones, 2000 UT App 211,^13, 11 P.3d 709. In addition, Utah Code 
section 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii) states: 
If, upon expiration or termination of the 
probation period under Subsection (10)(a)(I), 
there remains an unpaid balance upon the 
account receivable as defined in Section 76-
3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of 
the case and continue the defendant on bench 
probation for the limited purpose of 
enforcing the payment of the account 
receivable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (ii) (A) ; see also id. § 76-3-
201.1(1) (b) (Supp. 2006) (stating "Accounts receivable" includes 
"restitution to victims"). The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in ordering that probation would be extended until 
restitution is paid. 
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction insofar as it 
seeks to challenge the guilty plea and conviction. We affirm the 
sentencing order as entered by the district court. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
20061034-CA 3 
S T A T E O F U iAn 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
4^MK% F,LED 
& W )|) UTAH A P P E L U T E COURTS 
%^5'.#' MH 1 I 200? 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RAYMOND A. H«NTZE Protecting Utah • Protecting You K.RK TORGENSEN 
Chief Deputy 6 ° Chief Deputy 
11 January 2007 
Lisa Collins 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84114-0230 
"tit? 
Re: State v. Tenorio, Case No. 200509^-CA 
Dear Ms. Collins, 
This letter is offered pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
After the State filed its brief on July 31, 2006, the Utah Supreme Court decided State v. 
Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, P.3d , which is relevant to the State's argument that this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's claims. See Aple. Br. at 8-27. A copy of 
Nicholls is attached for the Court's convenience. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Karen A. Klucznik 
Assistant Attorney General 
encl. 
cc: Joan C. Watt, Attorney for Appellant (w/ encl.) 
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(Cite as: — P.3d — ) 
State v. NichollsUtah,2006. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Craig NICHOLLS, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 20050176. 
Dec. 5, 2006. 
Background: After defendant pled guilty in the 
First District, Logan, Gordon J. Low, J., to 
aggravated murder and was sentenced, the court 
dismissed defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, 
and denied his motion to correct illegal sentence 
and arrest judgment. Defendant appealed. 
Holding: The Supreme Court, Durham, C.J., held 
that post-conviction relief, rather than a motion to 
correct an illegal sentence, was the proper avenue to 
challenge guilty plea. 
Affirmed. 
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HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
1 lOkl 134 Scope and Extent in General 
HOkl 134(3) k. Questions Considered 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
The Supreme Court reviews questions of law for 
correctness, granting no deference to the district 
court. 
[2] Sentencing and Punishment 350H €^>2222 
350H Sentencing and Punishment 
350HXII Reconsideration and Modification of 
Sentence 
350HXII(A) In General 
350Hk2222 k. Existence of Other 
Remedies. Most Cited Cases 
Post-conviction relief, rather than a motion to 
correct an illegal sentence, was the proper avenue 
for defendant to challenge his guilty plea, based on 
his allegedly impaired mental state at time of the 
plea; defendant did not make any other challenge 
concerning his sentence, and given that defendant 
had already been sentenced, his challenge to his 
guilty plea could only be pursued under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act. Rules Crim.Proc, 
Rule 22(e); Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65C; West's 
U.C.A. §77-13-6(2)(c). 
[3] Criminal Law 110 €^1044.1(2) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110kl044 Motion Presenting Objection 
110kl044.1 In General; Necessity 
of Motion 
110kl044.1(2) k. Preliminary 
Proceedings; Indictment, Information, or 
Complaint. Most Cited Cases 
Appellate review is barred when the conviction 
being challenged is in the form of a guilty plea and 
the defendant attempts to withdraw that plea using a 
motion to correct an illegal sentence. Rules 
Crim.Proc, Rule 22(e). 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty Gen., Joanne C. Slotnik, 
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Herm Olsen, Logan, for defendant. 
DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
*1 % 1 This case comes before us on appeal from 
the district court's denial of a motion to correct an 
illegal sentence. We affirm. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
— P 3d — 
... p 3d —-, 2006 W L 3488936 (Utah), 2006 UT 76 
(Cite as: — P.3d — ) 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1 2 On November 10, 2003, Craig Nicholls, 
(Defendant) pled guilty to and was simultaneously 
sentenced for the cume of aggravated murder On 
December 1, 2003, Defendant, acting pro se, filed a 
letter and document with the district court which the 
court treated as a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
The court dismissed the motion stating that it had 
no jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 
77-13-6 and directed Defendant to pursue his claim 
under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and rule 
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Then, on 
November 15, 2004, Defendant, once again acting 
pro se, filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence 
and Arrest Judgment The motion was denied for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction Defendant 
appealed, and counsel was appointed for purposes 
of this appeal We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(i) (2002) 
ANALYSIS 
[1] 1f 3 The district court denied Defendant's 
motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction This 
presents a question of law, which we review for 
correctness, granting no deference to the district 
court Beaver County v Qwest, Inc, 2001 UT 81, H 
8, 31 P 3d 1147 
[2] H 4 This action was filed in the guise of a 
motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
However, the substance of the relief sought is the 
withdrawal of Defendant's guilty plea due to lack of 
a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights 
[3] H 5 Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure states that "The court may correct an 
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time " However, this court has held 
that "an appellate court may not review the legality 
of a sentence under rule 22(e) when the substance 
of the appeal is a challenge, not to the sentence 
itself, but to the underlying conviction" State v 
Brooks, 908 P 2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995), see also 
State v Telfoid, 2002 UT 51, f 7, 48 P 3d 228, 
State v Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, \ 8, 994 P 2d 
© 2007 Thomson/West No 
1243 Similarly, review is barred when the " 
conviction" being challenged is in the form of a 
guilty plea and the defendant attempts to withdraw 
that plea using a rule 22(e) challenge State v Reyes, 
2002 UT 13, H 3, 40 P 3d 630 In this case, the 
substance of Defendant's appeal is a challenge to his 
guilty plea based on his alleged "seriously impaired 
mental state" at the time of the plea He does not 
make any other challenge concerning his sentence 
Thus, rule 22(e) is an improper avenue of relief for 
Defendant's claims 
1} 6 Furthermore, under Utah Code section 
77-13-6(2)(b) (Supp2006), "[a] request to 
withdraw a plea of guilty shall be made by 
motion before sentence is announced" In 
Defendant's case, he was sentenced immediately 
after he entered his guilty plea and waived the 
statutory time period during which he could have 
withdrawn his plea Thus, Defendant's challenge to 
his guilty plea, having been made outside the time 
period specified by statute, can only "be pursued 
under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act, and rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure" Utah Code Ann § 77-13-6(2)(c), see 
State v Merrill, 2005 UT 34, %% 1, 6-7, 13-20, 
114 P 3d 585, Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 3, 40 P 3d 630 
*2 K 7 The Post-Conviction Remedies Act is thus 
the proper, and only, avenue for relief now 
available to Defendant We note that Defendant 
may be entitled to counsel pursuant to Utah Code 
section 78-35a-109 
CONCLUSION 
H 8 We affirm the district court's denial of 
Defendant's motion Defendant must pursue his 
claims under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and 
rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
H 9 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice 
DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Justice 
NEHRING concur in Chief Justice DURHAM'S 
opinion 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT OSORIO TENORIO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050976-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from guilty pleas to communications fraud, a second degree 
felony, and forgery, a third degree felony. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over 
appeals from second and third degree felony convictions under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does this Court have jurisdiction to review defendant's challenges to 
his guilty pleas where he did not file a timely motion to withdraw his 
pleas? 
An appellate court's determination of whether it has jurisdiction to hear an appeal 
is a question of law. See Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6,f 18, 44 P.3d 663. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are attached at 
Addendum A: 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI; 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004); 
Utah R. App. P. 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1 
In 1996, defendant obtained a social security card from a person on the street so 
that he could obtain employment (R. 277:35). In fact, the card defendant obtained was a 
counterfeit (R. 277:32). The number on the card, however, was "a validly issued social 
security number issued to another individual" (R. 277:32). At the time, defendant 
understood that "it was wrong to use that number" (R. 277:35-36). 
In 1999, defendant used the social security card to apply for a mortgage guaranteed 
by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") (R. 
277:36; R. 335-40). In addition to the social security number, the card he presented also 
contained his type-written name and signature (R. 340). 
Documents received as part of the application included documents verifying 
defendant's employment (R. 350-51). Those documents listed defendant's social security 
number as the one on the card he obtained in 1996 (R. 350-51). 
!The facts of the crime are taken from defendant's preliminary hearing. 
2 
On January 28,1999, defendant closed on a Federal Housing Association loan in 
the amount of $83,871.00, secured by a residence at 968 South 300 West, Salt Lake City, 
Utah (R. 277:7, 14-17, 24-27; R. 342-44, 353-54). If the loan company had known that 
defendant was using a false social security card, it would not have issued the loan (R. 
277:12). If the title company had known that defendant was using a false social security 
card, it would not have completed the closing (R. 277:26). 
Defendant eventually defaulted on the loan (R. 277:7). As a result, HUD lost 
$50,817 (R. 277:8). 
On July 2,2004, defendant was charged with one count of communications fraud, 
a second degree felony, or in the alternative, theft by deception, also a second degree 
felony; and one count of forgery, a third degree felony (R. 2-8). After a preliminary 
hearing, defendant was bound over as charged (R. 46-47). 
On April 22,2005, a week before his scheduled trial, defendant entered into a plea 
agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of 
communications fraud, a second degree felony, and one count of forgery, a third degree 
felony, and to pay restitution (R. 162). In return, the State agreed (1) not to file charges 
"based upon state tax code violations"; (2) not to file identity theft or forgery charges 
"arising from defendant's use of [the] social security number . . . [to secure his most 
3 
recent] employment"; (3) to recommend that any jail sentences be suspended in favor of 
deportation; and (4) to recommend concurrent sentences for the two crimes (R. 169). 
Before accepting defendant's pleas, the trial court explained to defendant the rights 
he would be waiving by entering the pleas (R. 276:24). The court also explained that, "by 
entering this plea,... you would be severely limiting your appeal rights" (R. 276:24). 
After defendant confirmed that he understood "everything that was covered" in his 
written plea statement, and that defendant was satisfied with the advice he had received 
from his counsel, the court instructed defendant to sign his written plea statement (R. 
276:26, 28; R. 161-74, 184-85). The plea statement signed by defendant stated, "I know 
that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I would have the 
right to appeal my conviction and sentence.... I understand that I am giving up my right 
to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty." (R. 167). 
Before accepting defendant's pleas, the court also explained the statutory penalties 
and elements of both communications fraud and forgery (R. 276:26-27). Concerning the 
forgery charge, the court explained that, "[by your plea,] [y]ou're also admitting that on or 
about January 1999 in Salt Lake County, with a purpose to defraud or understanding and 
knowledge that j^ ou were facilitating a fraud, you made or uttered a writing that purported 
to be the act of somebody else" (R. 276:27). The court then asked, "Do you understand 
that those are the things you would be admitting?" Defendant responded, "Yes" (R. 
276:27). 
4 
Finally, the parties discussed the factual bases for defendant's pleas: That, "[u]sing 
his own name but this fake social security number," defendant "represented that number 
to be his own in order to obtain a HUD guaranteed loan for a house which he 
subsequently defaulted on" (R. 276:21-22, 28-29). 
After concluding that "[t]hose facts support the plea that has been entered," the 
trial court accepted defendant's pleas as knowing and voluntary (R. 276:30). The court 
then instructed defendant that "[a]ny attempt to withdraw [these] plea[s] would have to be 
done in writing . . . and needs to be made before you are sentenced" (R. 276:30). 
Defendant's written plea statement also informed him that any motion to withdraw his 
pleas had to be made "before sentence is announced" (R. 171). 
Defendant's original sentencing date of June 3, 2005, was reset to July 22, 2005 
because the trial court had not received the presentence investigation report in time to 
review it for the June hearing (R. 193-94). On July 22,2005, defendant was sentenced to 
a suspended term of 365 days in jail. Defendant was placed on probation, ordered to pay 
restitution, and ordered to surrender himself for deportation (R. 196-97). 
Defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty pleas before announcement of 
sentence, nor did he appeal from the trial court's final judgment. 
On August 22, 2005, the State filed a motion to correct defendant's sentences 
because "[t]he sentence as currently worded does not indicate that the defendant was 
sentenced to a suspended sentence of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison . . . for 
5 
the Third [D]egree Felony conviction nor a suspended sentence of one to fifteen years in 
the Utah State Prison for the Second Degree Communications Fraud" (R. 200-02, 230-32, 
248-51). Defendant opposed the State's motion (R. 221-24). 
On October 7, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on the State's motion and 
corrected defendant's sentences. At the same hearing, the court granted defense 
counsel's motion to withdraw and appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association as 
defendant's appellate counsel (R. 252-53).2 
On October 20, 2005, defendant filed a notice of appeal (259-60). The record on 
appeal was then supplemented to include exhibits presented by the State at defendant's 
preliminary hearing (unnumbered signed minute entry filed April 24, 2006). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Although defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in the trial 
court, defendant challenges the validity of those guilty pleas on appeal. In raising his 
claims, defendant acknowledges the multitude of cases holding that an appellate court 
lacks jurisdiction to review a plea absent the filing of a timely motion to withdraw. 
Defendant claims, however, that none of those cases apply here because "[t]he Utah 
Supreme Court has never held in a case on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction 
2Although no signed order appears in the record, a signed order was attached to 
defendant's Docketing Statement filed with this Court. The State therefore does not ask 
this Court to dismiss the matter for lack of jurisdiction, but does ask this Court to order 
defendant to make the trial court's final judgment a part of the record on appeal. 
6 
that it cannot conduct a plain error review of a guilty plea proceeding or assess a guilty 
plea for ineffective assistance." Alternatively, defendant claims that any interpretation of 
the plea statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b), that precludes review of his claims "on 
direct appeal for failure to timely move to withdraw the guilty plea" is unconstitutional. 
Defendant's appeal fails. First, defendant's case is not before this Court on direct 
appeal from a judgment of conviction. Rather, it is before this Court on appeal from a 
subsequent judgment on the State's motion to correct defendant's sentence. The supreme 
court has held that appellate courts have no jurisdiction to consider a defendant's 
challenges to his guilty pleas on appeal from a judgment on a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence. Under that precedent, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's 
claims here. 
Second, even if defendant's case were on direct appeal from his judgment of 
conviction, this Court would still lack jurisdiction to consider his claims. Under Utah's 
plea withdrawal statute and well-established law interpreting that statute, a defendant who 
wants to challenge his guilty pleas on appeal must first file a timely motion to withdraw in 
the trial court. If a defendant fails to file such a motion, appellate courts lack jurisdiction 
to consider a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea on appeal, regardless of the rubric 
under which he raises them. To the extent that defendant claims that such a scheme 
unconstitutionally deprives him of his right to appeal (and the rights to counsel and due 
7 
process that accompany the right to appeal), defendant forfeited that claim when he 
waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGES TO HIS GUILTY PLEAS WHERE 
HE DID NOT FILE A TIMELY MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
PLEAS 
Although defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in the trial 
court, defendant challenges those guilty pleas on appeal. In raising his claims, defendant 
acknowledges the multitude of cases holding that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to 
review a plea absent the filing of a timely motion to withdraw. Defendant claims, 
however, that none of those cases apply here because "[t]he Utah Supreme Court has 
never held in a case on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction that it cannot 
conduct a plain error review of a guilty plea proceeding or assess a guilty plea for 
ineffective assistance." Aplt Br. at 36. 
Alternatively, defendant asserts that, "[t]o the extent current interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) precludes review of cases of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, plain error review for Rule 11 violations, and cases of exception circumstances on 
direct appeal for failure to timely move to withdraw the guilty plea, such interpretation 
violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution which guarantees the 
right to counsel, violates the due process right to a knowing and voluntary plea, prevents 
8 
Rule 11 protections for defendants, and denies the right to a full and fair appeal." Aplt. 
Br. at 36. 
Defendant's jurisdictional claims fail on multiple grounds. First, defendant's 
appeal is not from his original judgment of conviction. Rather, his appeal is from a 
subsequent judgment on a motion to correct defendant's sentences. In a case directly on 
point, the supreme court has held that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider 
challenges to guilty pleas for the first time on appeal from such judgments. 
Second, even if defendant's appeal was a direct appeal from his convictions, 
Utah's plea withdrawal statute and well-established law interpreting that statute clearly 
preclude this Court from considering challenges to guilty pleas absent the timely filing of 
a motion to withdraw, regardless of the rubric under which he raises them. To the extent 
defendant claims that such an interpretation of the plea statute violates his constitutional 
right to an appeal, defendant waived that claim when he waived his right to appeal as part 
of his plea agreement. 
A. This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's challenges to his 
guilty pleas on appeal from a judgment on a motion to correct sentence. 
Defendant claims that this Court has jurisdiction to consider his challenges to his 
guilty pleas because, contrary to the multitude of cases precluding defendants from 
challenging their pleas on appeal from the denial of untimely motions to withdraw, his 
case is on direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction. See Aplt. Br. at 36-41. 
Defendant's appeal, however, is not from a final judgment of conviction. Rather, it is a 
9 
from a final judgment on a motion to correct defendant's sentence, and binding precedent 
holds that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to guilty pleas on 
appeal from such judgments. 
1. Defendant's notice of appeal was not timely to perfect an appeal 
from the trial court's final judgment of conviction. 
As a general rule, "[i]n a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right 
from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal... shall be filed with the 
clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). This 30-day deadline is jurisdictional. See State 
v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100,15, 57 P.3d 1065 ("This court has previously recognized that 
the 30-day period for filing notice of appeal in a criminal case . . . is jurisdictional") 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Although rule 4(b) provides exceptions to the general rule when "a party timely 
files" certain enumerated motions, none of those motions were filed in defendant's case. 
Utah R. App. P. 4(b). And, although rule 4(e) allows the trial court to extend the time for 
filing a notice of appeal under limited circumstances, see id. 4(e), defendant never 
requested an extension here. 
Consequently, under rule 4(a), defendant had thirty days from entry of the trial 
court's final judgment of conviction to perfect a direct appeal from that judgment. 
A final judgment on defendant's convictions was entered on July 22, 2005 (R. 196-97). 
Under rule 4, then, defendant had until August 22, 2005, to file a notice of appeal if he 
10 
wished to challenge his sentences.3 See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Defendant did not file a 
notice of appeal, however, until October 20,2005—59 days later (R. 259-60). 
Defendant's notice of appeal, therefore, did not perfect an appeal from the trial court's 
final judgment of conviction. 
Defendant's notice did, however, perfect an appeal from the trial court's 
subsequent judgment responding to the State's motion to correct defendant's sentences. 
The State filed its motion on August 22, 2005 (R. 200-02, 230-32, 248-51). After a 
hearing, the trial court entered a final judgment correcting defendant's sentences on 
October 7, 2005 (R. 252-53). On October 20, 2005, defendant filed a notice of appeal 
indicating that he was appealing "from the final judgment/order rendered against him on 
the 7th day of October, 2005" (R. 259-60). Defendant's notice of appeal was filed within 
thirty days of the trial court's final judgment correcting defendant's sentences. Thus, his 
notice did perfect an appeal from that judgment. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). 
Notwithstanding, defendant does not challenge the trial court's judgment 
correcting his sentences on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 13-36. Rather, defendant challenges 
the validity of his guilty pleas underlying those sentences. See id. As stated, defendant's 
notice of appeal is untimely as to those claims. This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to 
consider his claims. 
3Thirty days from July 22, 2005, was actually August 21, 2005. However, August 
.21,2005, fell on a Sunday. Thus, defendant had until the following business day, August 
22,2005, to file his notice of appeal. 
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2. The Utah Supreme Court has held that an appellate court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea 
on appeal from a judgment on a motion to correct sentences. 
This Court also lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's claims under State v. 
Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 40 P.3d 630. Reyes entered guilty pleas to rape of a child and 
sodomy of a child. Id. at f L Like defendant here, Reyes never filed a motion to 
withdraw his pleas or a timely notice of appeal from the final judgment concerning those 
pleas. Id. Rather, after the time for filing either of those had expired, Reyes filed a 
motion to correct his sentence. Id. When the trial court denied Reyes' motion, Reyes 
appealed. Id. at f 2. 
For the first time on appeal, Reyes attacked his guilty pleas, "arguing that the trial 
court committed plain error by failing to strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure." Id. at^ f 3. The supreme court "decline[d] to address [Reyes' claim] 
because we do not have jurisdiction to address it." Id. 
As the supreme court explained, settled law provides that a defendant must "move 
for a withdrawal [of a guilty plea] in the district court before he can challenge a plea on 
appeal." Id. (quoting State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, Tf 10, 31 P.3d 528). A defendant's 
failure to file a timely motion to withdraw "extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge 
the validity of the guilty plea on appeal." Id. at ^ f 3 (citing State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 
995 (Utah 1993); State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, \ 10, 31 P.3d 528 (quoting State v. 
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064,1067 (Utah 1993))). 
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When Reyes, like defendant here, argued that the court could nonetheless review 
his plea "if plain error or exceptional circumstances exist/' the supreme court rejected that 
claim. Id. at % 4. As the court explained, "[t]his court may choose to review an issue not 
properly preserved for plain error. It cannot, however, use plain error to reach an issue 
over which it has no jurisdiction." Id. 
The supreme court's holding in Reyes is consistent with precedent discussing the 
procedures applicable to withdrawal of guilty pleas. See id. at fflf 3-4 (discussing 
precedent); see also State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ffif 15-17, 114 P.3d 585 (same). It is 
also consistent with precedent precluding defendants from challenging their convictions 
through motions to correct sentences brought under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, Tf 7, 48 P.3d 228 (holding 
that "a defendant may not employ rule 22(e) to attack the underlying conviction"); State v. 
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, \ 8, 994 P.2d 1243 (holding that court of appeals erred in 
concluding that rule 22(e) allowed it to reach claim challenging legality of defendant's 
conviction); State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) (holding that "[a] request to 
correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) presupposes a valid conviction," and, 
"[tjherefore, issues concerning the validity of a conviction are not cognizable under rule 
22(e)"). 
Reyes disposes of the jurisdictional question here. As in Reyes, defendant never 
filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Rather, as in Reyes, defendant challenges his 
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guilty pleas for the first time on appeal from a judgment on a motion to correct sentence. 
Just as the supreme court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant's claims in Reyes, 
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's claims here. 
"Once a court has determined that it lacks jurisdiction, it 'retains only the authority 
to dismiss the action.'" State v. Yardley, 2004 UT App 47,15, 87 P.3d 749 (quoting 
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989)). 
B. Even if defendant's appeal were from his judgment of conviction, this 
Court would nonetheless lack jurisdiction to consider his claims. 
But, even if defendant were directly appealing from his convictions, this Court 
would nonetheless lack jurisdiction to consider his claims. 
1. Under settled law, defendant's failure to file a timely motion to 
withdraw in the trial court divests this Court of jurisdiction to 
consider his challenges on appeal. 
Under well-established law, any defendant who wishes to challenge his guilty 
pleas in the criminal proceeding must first file a timely motion to withdraw his pleas. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2);4 see also State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, \ 30, 114 P.3d 585 
(holding that plea statute offers only two means by which to challenge plea—through 
motion to withdraw filed within statutory period and petition for post-conviction relief 
4Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004), provides: 
(2) (b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be made by motion before 
sentence is announced.... 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in 
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post Conviction Remedies 
Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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filed after statutory period); State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 4, 40 P.3d 630; State v. 
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064,1067 (Utah 1993) (holding that defendant must move to 
withdraw his plea in the trial court before he can challenge that plea on appeal), 
abrogation on other grounds recognized in State v. Manning, 2005 UT 61, f 25, 122 P.3d 
628. 
Under that same well-established law, if a defendant fails to file a timely motion in 
the trial court, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider his claims. See Merrill, 2005 
UT 34, \ 20 (rejecting defendant's claim that trial court has jurisdiction over untimely 
motion to withdraw); State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, If 13, 31 P.3d 528 (noting jurisdictional 
nature of plea statute); State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) (holding, under 
prior plea statute, that "the plea statute limits a defendant's right to withdraw his or her 
guilty plea to thirty days after entry of the plea" and that, "[thereafter, the right is 
extinguished"); State v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah App. 1996) ("[I]f a defendant 
is advised of the deadline when the plea is entered, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider a motion to withdraw filed after the thirty-day period."); State v. Price, 837 P.2d 
578, 583 (Utah App. 1992) (holding that statutory period for filing motion to withdraw is 
jurisdictional), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, \ 11, 31 P.3d 
528; see also State v. Huynh, 2006 UT App 273U, *1 (June 29, 2006) (per curiam) 
("Because Huynh failed to file a timely motion to withdraw her guilty plea, the district 
court correctly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to consider her motion."); State 
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v. Helbach, 2004 UT App 388U, *2 (Oct. 28, 2004) (per curiam) (holding, under 
amended statute, that "trial court lacked jurisdiction" to consider defendant's motion to 
withdraw where motion was filed after announcement of sentence) (copies of unpublished 
decisions attached at Addendum B). 
And, as stated, under that same well-established law, "failure to [file a timely 
motion in the trial court also] extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of 
the guilty plea on appeal." Reyes, 2002 UT \3,\3\see also Manning, 2005 UT 61, [^f 36 
(rejecting claim that "defendants who enter guilty pleas remain entitled to [their full 
constitutional] right to appeal"; holding that challenges to pleas "may only be undertaken 
following a timely motion to withdraw"); Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ^  20 (holding that 
"jurisdictional implications of section 77-13-6(2)(b) are independent of the court whose 
jurisdiction the defendant seeks to invoke."); Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1067 (holding that 
defendant must first file motion to withdraw in trial court before appellate court may 
consider claims on appeal); Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995 (holding that "the plea statute limits a 
defendant's right to withdraw his or her guilty plea" and that, "thereafter, the right is 
extinguished"); State v. Lebow, 2006 UT App 27U, *1 (Feb. 2, 2006) (per curiam) 
(holding, under new statute, that "[a]bsent a timely motion to withdraw, appellate courts 
lack jurisdiction to consider any issue attacking the guilty plea itself, including whether a 
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea agreement"); State v. 
Mallen, 2005 UT App 443U, *1 (Oct. 14, 2005) (per curiam) (holding, under new statute, 
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that "[t]his court lacks jurisdiction to address plea issues on appeal absent a timely motion 
to withdraw"); State v. Sousa, 2003 UT App 320U, * 1 (Sept. 25,2003) (per curiam) 
(holding that "section 77-13-6 does not permit this court, in this direct appeal,... to set 
aside defendant's plea ") (copies of unpublished decisions attached at Addendum B). 
In this case, defendant never moved to withdraw his pleas in the trial court. 
Consequently, under well-established law, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider 
defendant's claims. As discussed below, defendant's contentions otherwise lack merit 
2. Defendant's contention that this Court may hear his claims 
because he appeals directly from his convictions fails, where he 
waived his right to appeal his convictions as part of his plea 
agreement. 
Defendant acknowledges that this Court has repeatedly held, based on the well-
established law discussed above, that it lacks jurisdiction to consider challenges to guilty 
pleas on direct appeal from judgments of conviction. See Aplt. Br. at 40-41; see also 
State v. Latu, 2004 UT App 437U, *l-2 (per curiam) (rejecting defendant's contention 
that "denial of a direct appeal from the plea would result in violations of his constitutional 
rights"; holding that "[b]ecause Latu failed to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
this court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal"); State v. King, 2004 UT App 79U, * 1 (per 
curiam) (holding court lacked jurisdiction to consider challenges to guilty plea on direct 
appeal absent timely motion to withdraw) (copies of unpublished decisions attached at 
Addendum B). 
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However, defendant contends that this Court nonetheless has jurisdiction because 
"[t]he Utah Supreme Court has never held in a case on direct appeal from the judgment of 
conviction that it cannot conduct a plain error review of a guilty plea proceeding or assess 
a guilty plea for ineffective assistance." Aplt. Br. at 36-41 (attempting to distinguish 
Reyes and Merrill because they involved appeals from a judgment on motion to correct 
illegal sentences and a judgment denying an untimely motion to withdraw, respectively). 
Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
In its simplest terms, defendant contends that because he—unlike the numerous 
other defendants who filed untimely motions to withdraw—disregarded the statutory 
requirement of filing a motion to withdraw altogether, he should have the right to 
challenge his guilty pleas on direct appeal, even though those other defendants—who at 
least attempted to adhere to the statute—did not. Defendant's contention is contrary to 
every recent Utah appellate court decision on this issue, all of which steadfastly require 
the filing of a timely motion to withdraw before challenges to guilty pleas may be 
considered on appeal. 
The supreme court's recent decision in State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 585, 
most directly disposes of defendant's claim. Merrill appealed from the denial of an 
untimely motion to withdraw. Merrill asserted first that any statutory limit on filing 
motions to withdraw was directory, not jurisdictional; thus, the trial court erred in denying 
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his motion as untimely. Id. at % 13. Alternatively, Merrill claimed that the plea statute's 
time limit on filing motions to withdraw was unconstitutional. Id. at 21. 
In rejecting Merrill's claims, the supreme court noted that "[t]he right to seek 
withdrawal of a guilty plea" is a right "granted by statute" that is "without express 
constitutional protection." Id. at ^  45. As such, the legislature has the authority to 
statutorily determine what procedures a defendant must follow in order to challenge his 
pleas. See id. at f 47 (rejecting claim that plea statute violated separations of power 
provision of constitution). 
The court then noted that the plea statute "provides [only] two opportunities to 
challenge the validity of a guilty plea: a motion to withdraw the plea, which must be 
brought within the . . . statutory window, and an action for post-conviction relief, which 
may be brought after the expiration of the . . . statutory period." Id. at f 30. It does not 
provide a defendant with the right to challenge his plea on direct appeal from his 
convictions. Id, at \ 44 (recognizing that plea statute replaces direct appeal as means by 
which defendants may "challenge their guilty pleas"). 
In other words, under the first option provided by the plea statute, a defendant 
must "move for a withdrawal in the district court before he can challenge a plea on 
appeal." Id. at % 17 (quoting State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, Tf 3, 40 P.3d 630 (quoting State 
v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, f 10, 31 P.3d 528 (citing State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 
(Utah 1993)))) (emphasis added). 
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The clear import of Merrill, and indeed the prior cases upon which it relies, is that 
the only procedures by which a defendant may challenge a guilty plea are the two 
procedures provided by the plea statute. And, if a defendant does not file a timely motion 
to withdraw under the first procedure, he cannot sidestep the jurisdictional bar of the 
statute simply by filing a direct appeal from his convictions. See also Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 
f 3 ("We have held that failure to [file a timely motion to withdraw] extinguishes a 
defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea on appeal"); Merrill, 2005 UT 
34, \ 20 (holding that "jurisdictional implications of section 77-13-6(2)(b) are 
independent of the court whose jurisdiction the defendant seeks to invoke."); Johnson, 
856 P.2d at 1067 (holding that defendant must first file motion to withdraw in trial court 
before appellate court may consider claims on appeal); Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995 (holding 
that "the plea statute limits a defendant's right to withdraw his or her guilty plea" and 
that, "thereafter, the right is extinguished"). 
Rather, the defendant's only option is to proceed with a post-conviction petition. 
See Merrill, 2005 UT 34, fflf 21-47 (holding that plea statute providing that defendants 
who fail to file a timely motions to withdraw may only challenge their pleas through post-
conviction proceeding does not violate constitutional rights of open courts, separation of 
powers, due process, equal protection, uniform operation of laws, right to counsel). 
Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628—a case completely ignored by 
defendant—confirms that conclusion. Manning entered guilty pleas pursuant to a plea 
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bargain. Fifty-seven days after final judgment, Manning filed a pro se notice of appeal 
which the trial court dismissed as untimely. Manning, 2005 UT 61, ^ 2-5. 
In a post-conviction petition, Manning claimed that her attorney had failed to 
inform her of her right to appeal and "that, as a result," her constitutional right to appeal 
had been violated. Id. at \ 6. After the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial 
of Manning's petition, the supreme court granted certiorari, first, to reconsider the 
procedure defendants must follow in order to revive their right to appeal in cases where 
that right has been violated and, second, to determine "whether a defendant's request for 
resentencing must be granted unless the record demonstrates that the defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal, and, if so, whether Manning 
knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal in this case." Id. at \ 9. 
After redefining the procedure defendants must follow in order to revive a lost 
right to appeal, see id. at ffif 26-31, the supreme court addressed whether Manning had 
knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal her convictions, id. at 32. In doing 
so, the supreme court rejected Manning's contention that "defendants who enter guilty 
pleas remain entitled to the article I, section 12 right to appeal." Id. at ^ f 36. The court 
held that "Manning waived the right to appeal her conviction[s] by entering a knowing 
and voluntary guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement that expressly indicated she would 
waive her right to appeal." Id. at ^ f 37. Consequently, "Manning could only contest this 
waiver by first filing a timely motion to withdraw her guilty pleas and then establishing 
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that her pleas were not knowing and voluntary." Id. (citing State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 
3, 40 P.3d 630). Without first filing a timely motion to withdraw, "she could not appeal 
her conviction or the knowing and voluntary nature of her guilty plea"; rather, "any 
remaining rights to appeal were necessarily limited to appealing her sentence." Id. 
Manning was not a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction. However, citing 
one of the very jurisdictional cases defendant now attempts to avoid, Manning clearly 
addressed what issues a defendant could raise in such an appeal after entering a guilty 
plea pursuant to an agreement in which the defendant waived his right to appeal. See 
Manning, 2005 UT 61, ffif 36-37 (citing Reyes, 2002 UT 13,13). 
Manning also precludes defendant's appeal here. Defendant's written plea 
statement stated that "I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a 
jury or judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence.... I 
understand that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty." (R. 
167). Moreover, during the plea hearing, the trial court specifically told defendant that, 
"by entering this plea,... you would be severely limiting your appeal rights," as 
"explained in more detail in [the plea agreement]" (R. 276:24). 
Thus, like Manning, defendant "waived the right to appeal [his] conviction by 
entering a knowing and voluntary guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement that expressly 
indicated [he] would waive [his] right to appeal." Manning, 2005 UT 61, ^ 37. 
Consequently, like Manning, defendant "could not appeal [his] conviction or the knowing 
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and voluntary nature of [his] guilty plea" without first filing a timely motion to withdraw 
in the trial court. Id. Defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his pleas in the trial 
court, let alone a timely one. Thus, consistent with Manning and the foregoing authority, 
this Court cannot hear his claims. 
3. Defendant's contention that this Court may hear his claims 
because, otherwise, the plea statute unconstitutionally deprives 
him of his right to appeal fails, where he waived his right to 
appeal as part of his plea agreement. 
Alternatively, defendant contends that, "[t]o the extent current interpretation of 
[Utah's plea withdrawal statute] precludes review of cases of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims,... and cases of exceptional circumstances on direct appeal for failure to 
timely move to withdraw the guilty plea," Aplt. Br. at 36, that interpretation should be 
overruled because it "violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
which guarantees the right to counsel, violates the due process right to a knowing and 
voluntary plea,... and denies the right to a full and fair appeal." Aplt. Br. at 36, 41.5 
5
 Although defendant raises rule 11 claims as one of the bases for his constitutional 
challenge, see Aplt. Br. at 45 (asserting that denial of his right to raise rule 11 challenges 
on appeal is unconstitutional "because a defendant cannot bring all rule 11 plain error 
violations in post conviction relief), his reliance on rule 11 is misplaced. Before 2003, 
the plea statute provided that "[a] plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) 
(1999). Utah courts uniformly held that a trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule 
11(e) constituted "good cause" under the plea withdrawal statute. See, e.g., State v. 
Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, ^ 6, 68 P.3d 1035 (holding that defendant may generally 
withdraw plea where trial court has not strictly complied with rule 11); State v. Smith, 812 
P.2d 470,476 (Utah App. 1991) ("[A] trial court errs when it refuses to allow the 
withdrawal of a guilty or no contest plea that was not entered in strict compliance with 
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Although defendant attempts to present his constitutional claims as three distinct 
claims—denial of the right to an appeal, denial of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, and denial of the right to due process—his argument as a whole indicates that his 
latter two claims are subsumed in the first. 
Specifically, the logic of defendant's argument appears to be that (1) because a 
defendant has the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal 
from a conviction but not in a post-conviction proceeding, see Aplt. Br. at 41, 45, denying 
defendant the right to a direct appeal necessarily also denies him the right to effective 
Rule 11."). 
In 2003, however, the Legislature amended the plea statute to provide that a guilty 
plea "may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 2004). 
This is the same standard necessary to prove that a plea is unconstitutional. See 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (holding that due process requires 
that plea be "equally voluntary and knowing"). It is also the same showing a defendant 
must make when he challenges the validity of guilty pleas in proceedings brought under 
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(a) (West 2004) 
(providing that defendant may petition for post-conviction relief if "the conviction was 
obtained . . . in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution"). 
And, because "a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea does 
not in itself amount to a violation of a defendant's rights under either the Utah or the 
United States Constitution," Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993), such a 
failure is no longer, by itself, sufficient to withdraw a plea. In other words, under the 
prior plea statute, a defendant could withdraw his plea if he could show error in the taking 
of the plea under rule 11, because a rule 11 violation constituted "good cause." Under the 
new statute, however, that claim is no longer available because a rule 11 violation, by 
itself, does not establish an unknowing and involuntary plea. 
Thus, defendant's contention that the inability to challenge pleas on direct appeal 
is unconstitutional because it "foreclose^]" certain rule 11 claims that would otherwise 
be available, see Aplt. Br. at 45, is simply no longer correct. 
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assistance of counsel that would accompany the appeal; and (2) because a defendant 
presumably would have the due process right to counsel and to assert all his challenges on 
direct appeal, but not in a post-conviction proceeding, see Aplt. Br. at 36, 42, 45,46, 
denying him the right a direct appeal would also deny him the right to due process. 
In other words, defendant's contention is that an interpretation of the plea statute that 
denies him the right to directly appeal his guilty pleas is unconstitutional because it 
"leaves a defendant without the right and benefit to a foil and fair appeal," id. at 46, 
including the right to challenge the pleas on due process and rule 11 grounds and the 
benefit of constitutionally effective assistance of counsel, id. at 41. 
Under Manning, however, defendant waived his constitutional right to an appeal 
when he entered his pleas "pursuant to a plea agreement that expressly waive[d] the right 
to appeal." State v. Manning, 2005 UT 61, f 36,122 P.3d 628; see also pp. 20-23 supra 
(discussing express waiver of right to appeal contained in defendant's written plea 
statement). He therefore also waived any due process and effective assistance rights that 
would have attached to that appeal. 
And because defendant waived his right to appeal his convictions as part of his 
plea agreement, he has no standing to challenge the plea statute on the basis that it 
unconstitutionally denies him the right to appeal. Specifically, defendant cannot show 
that he "has suffered or will imminently suffer an injury that is fairly traceable" to the 
alleged unconstitutionality of the plea statute. Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 
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14, <[ 9, 86 P.3d 735 (discussing "basic requirements of standing"). Thus, he cannot show 
"that a favorable decision [on his constitutional claim] is likely to redress [that] injury." 
Id 
In any case, defendant's constitutional claim fails. "To prevail on any of his 
constitutional claims, [defendant] must overcome the presumption that [the plea statute,] 
section 77-13-6 is constitutional." State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, \ 22, 114 P.3d 585. 
Here, defendant cannot overcome that presumption of constitutionality because he fails to 
address the supreme court's decision in Merrill, which upheld the constitutionality of the 
plea statute against multiple constitutional challenges. See Merrill, 2005 UT 34, \ 32 
(rejecting Merrill's claim that plea statute is unconstitutional because it allows some 
defendants to challenge their pleas with the right to counsel and forces others to challenge 
their pleas in post-conviction proceedings in which appointment of counsel is 
discretionary); id, at *| 30 (rejecting Merrill's claim that plea statute violates due process 
because it "unconstitutionally impedes his opportunity to bring his claim that his plea was 
not knowing and voluntary before a court" where the statute "provides a meaningful 
opportunity for a hearing before the district court, regardless of whether the [statutory 
time] limit [for filing a motion to withdraw] was met"); id. at f 45 (suggesting that plea 
statute precluding direct appeal of convictions is not unconstitutional so long as statute 
"afford[s] defendants the opportunity to challenge their guilty pleas"); see Aplt. Br. at 39-
40 (discussing procedural posture of Merrill but failing to acknowledge, let alone 
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distinguish, the constitutional holdings of the supreme court in that case); see also State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398, 399 (Utah 1994) (holding that "[t]hose asking [court] to 
overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion" and that they can 
succeed only if court becomes '"clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous 
or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will 
come by departing from precedent'") (citations omitted). 
Consequently, defendant's constitutional claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to dismiss defendant's appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction or to otherwise affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 3[_ July 2006. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. K L U C Z N I K ) 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
AHHpnHnm A 
United States Const, Amend. VI 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
United States Const., Amend. XIV 
Amendment XIV. Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process; 
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of 
officers; public debt; enforcement 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a 
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the propor-
tion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
Utah Const., Art. I, §12 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband/nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004) 
§ 7 7 - 1 3 - 6 . Withdrawal of plea 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea 
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. 
Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held 
in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of 
pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified 
in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Utah R. App. P. 4 
RULE 4. APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: WHEN TAKEN 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court 
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or 
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions. 
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the 
time for all parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the 
order disposing of the motion: 
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules'lof Civil 
Procedure; 
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or 
not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted, 
under Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; or 
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but 
before entry of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be 
treated as filed after entry of the order and on the day thereof, except that such 
a notice of appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying judgment. To 
appeal from a final order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party 
must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal within the 
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after 
the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before entry of the 
judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusa-
ble neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. A motion filed before 
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court 
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed 
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice 
of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time 
or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever 
occurs later. 
(f) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined 
in an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the 
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail 
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a 
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and 
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in 
the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in 
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice of 
appeal. 
Addendum B 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 1 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 2404373 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 388 
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d) 
H 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK 
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Aaron L. HELBACH, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20040671-CA. 
Oct 28, 2004. 
Second District, Ogden Department; The 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson. 
Aaron L. Helbach, Gunnison, Appellant 
Pro Se. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Laura B. Dupaix, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and 
ORME. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Aaron Helbach appeals the trial court's 
denial of his motion to be resentenced. 
This is before the court on the State's 
motion for summary disposition based on 
lack of jurisdiction. 
Helbach pleaded guilty to a charge of 
aggravated robbery in August 2003. 
Helbach completed a statement in support 
of his guilty plea, giving the factual basis 
for his plea and waiving specific rights, 
including his right to appeal. The 
document also specified that he could 
withdraw his plea only on good cause 
shown, and that he must file a motion to 
withdraw his plea before the 
announcement of sentence. Helbach was 
sentenced in September 2003. 
In March 2004, Helbach filed a motion for 
resentencing in the trial court in his 
criminal case. Helbach asserted that he was 
incompetent at the time of his plea, and 
thus the plea was invalid. The trial court 
denied the motion on its merits, finding 
there was no indication that Helbach was 
not fully capable of entering a knowing 
and voluntary plea, and that the mental 
evaluation from the State did not indicate 
any disorder that would impact his 
competency. The trial court also noted the 
motion was filed several months after 
sentencing, but did "not address [the] 
timeliness of the Motion." 
Helbach asserts that his motion was filed " 
under the philosophy" of State v. Rees, 
2003 UT App 4, 63 P.3d 120, cert, granted, 
73 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003), which permitted 
a defendant to file a motion for 
resentencing in the sentencing court under 
particular circumstances. Helbach has 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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apparently seized on Rees to avoid going 
through the procedures for post-conviction 
relief as set forth in the Utah 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Act), Utah 
Code sections 78-35a-101 to -304 (2002), 
and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C. 
However, after Rees, this court has held 
that requests to be resentenced to permit a 
renewal of an opportunity to appeal fall 
squarely within rule 65C and the Act, See 
State v. Manning, 2004 UT App 87,f 21, 
89 P.3d 196, cert granted, 2004 Utah 
LEXIS 172(UtahAug. 11,2004). 
Additionally, Helbach has not shown that 
he comes within the scope of Rees. In Rees, 
this court held that extraordinary relief 
may be available in the sentencing court if 
a defendant has been denied the effective 
assistance of counsel on appeal. See Rees, 
2003 UT App 4 at If 6. Such relief, 
however, is available only in "limited 
circumstances, to modify or vacate a 
judgment where extra-record facts show 
that the defendant has been deprived of his 
constitutional right to a fair trial or 
meaningful appeal." Id. at f^ 13. Helbach 
waived his right to a trial and appeal by 
pleading guilty and does not come within 
the narrow scope of Rees. 
Instead, Helbach's motion is governed by 
Utah Code section 77-13-6, providing for 
the methods of challenging a guilty plea. 
Section 77-13-6 provides that a guilty plea 
"may be withdrawn only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (2003). A 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No CI 
..), 2004 UT App 388 
request to withdraw a plea "shall be made 
by motion before sentence is announced." 
Id. § 77-13-6(2)(b). If a defendant does not 
timely request to withdraw his plea, any 
challenge to the plea must be made 
pursuant to rule 65C and the Act. See id. § 
77-13-6(2)(c). 
*2 Helbach's motion requested 
resentencing, but attacked the validity of 
his plea, arguing he was incompetent. The 
trial court addressed the merits, finding 
that Helbach was not incompetent at his 
plea. The trial court also noted, but did not 
rule on, the late filing of the motion. In 
substance, Helbach's motion was a motion 
to withdraw his plea, and the trial court 
considered it as such. However, under 
section 77-13-6, the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to consider the motion because 
it was made months after sentence was 
announced. Section 77-13-6 limits a 
defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea 
to the time before the announcement of 
sentence. See id. § 77-13-6(2)(b). " 
Thereafter, the right is extinguished." State 
v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) 
(holding that failure to file a timely motion 
for withdrawal extinguishes the right). The 
timely filing of a notice to withdraw a plea 
is jurisdictional. See State v. Reyes, 2002 
UT13,Tfl[3-4,40P.3d630. 
The trial court lacked jurisdiction over 
Helbach's motion, and thus this court 
likewise lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. 
See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 
678-79 (Utah Ct.App.1991). Accordingly, 
this appeal is dismissed. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Appellant Shelly Huynh appeals the 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw Plea, Motion to Change Plea 
and Motion to Dismiss. 
Huynh was originally charged with a single 
count of aggravated arson, a first degree 
felony. On January 26, 2001, she pleaded 
guilty to one count of attempted arson, a 
third degree felony. On April 27, 2001, the 
district court sentenced her to an 
indeterminate term of no more than five 
years in prison, stayed that term, and 
placed her on probation. Both the caption 
and body of the sentencing order refer to 
the offense as "Attempted Aggravated 
Arson," a third degree felony. On June 27, 
2001, the court entered a revised sentence 
incorporating a restitution amount and 
ordering the sentence to remain as 
previously imposed. On July 14, 2003, 
Huynh filed a notice of appeal, seeking to 
challenge her conviction. This court 
dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction due to the untimely notice of 
appeal. See State v. Huynh 2003 UT App 
338 (per curiam). In 2004, the district court 
revoked Huynh's probation and reinstated 
her prison sentence. The judgment 
indicates that the offense was "Attempted 
Aggravated Arson (amended)," a third 
degree felony. 
In July 2005, Huynh sought to withdraw 
her guilty plea on several grounds, 
including a claim that she actually entered 
a not guilty plea. She also claimed that she 
pleaded guilty to attempted arson, but the 
district court entered a guilty plea to 
attempted aggravated arson, which she 
claims rendered her guilty plea and 
resulting conviction invalid. The district 
court denied the motion for lack of 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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jurisdiction because Huynh did not file a 
timely motion to withdraw her 2001 guilty 
plea. Because Huynh sought withdrawal of 
her guilty plea, instead of correction of the 
error in describing her offense, the court 
did not correct that error.™1 
FN1. On stipulation of the parties, 
the district court later entered an 
order intended to correct the error. 
The district court's order describes 
the error as a "caption error." In 
fact, the error also appears in the 
body of the original sentence. 
Because Huynh did not appeal from 
the order or seek the remedy of 
correction of any error in 
sentencing orders, we do not 
consider any issues regarding that 
order in this appeal. 
Huynh now asserts that she entered a guilty 
plea to attempted arson, but she was 
illegally sentenced to attempted aggravated 
arson. On that basis, she contends that she 
is entitled to withdraw her plea and have 
her conviction vacated. There is no time 
limit for bringing a motion to correct an 
illegal sentence under rule 22(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e) ("The court may 
correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." 
). However, Huynh is mistaken in her 
assertion that rule 22(e) provides a means 
to challenge her guilty plea and conviction. 
"A request to correct an illegal sentence 
presupposes a valid conviction." State v. 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
.), 2006 UT App 273 
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995). " 
Therefore, issues concerning the validity of 
a conviction are not cognizable under rule 
22(e)." Id. Because Huynh failed to file a 
timely motion to withdraw her guilty plea, 
the district court correctly concluded that it 
did not have jurisdiction to consider her 
motion. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,If 
31, 40 P.3d 630 (holding that failure to file 
a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
extinguishes the right to challenge the 
validity of the plea on appeal). 
*2 Huynh's reliance on State v. Arviso, 
1999 UT App 381, 993 P.2d 894, is 
misplaced. In Arviso, the district court 
suspended a defendant's prison sentence on 
the condition that he remain out of the 
United States, which was an illegal 
sentence. Noting that an illegal sentence 
may be corrected at any time, we stated 
that a court retains jurisdiction over a 
defendant until a valid sentence is 
imposed. See id. at f 8. However, we 
concluded that because the plea agreement 
in that case was based upon both parties' 
mistaken assumption that the court could 
impose a particular sentence, the plea 
bargain could not be enforced. Id. at f^ 10. 
The sentence in Huynh's case was a valid 
sentence for the third degree felony of 
attempted arson, and there is no 
demonstration that the plea bargain 
contemplated a particular sentence that 
later proved to be illegal. 
We affirm the order of the district court. 
UtahApp.,2006. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Mario D. King appeals his conviction 
and sentence for Forgery, a third degree 
felony, and Attempted Unlawful Use of a 
Credit Card, a class A misdemeanor. This 
appeal is before the court on King's motion 
for a remand pursuant to rule 23B of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and on 
the State's motion for partial dismissal of 
King did not file a timely motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas; nevertheless, he 
seeks to challenge the validity of the pleas 
on appeal, contending that his trial counsel 
was ineffective in advising him. The claim 
is, in substance, that his pleas were not 
knowing and voluntary when entered. 
Failure to file a timely motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea "extinguishes a defendant's 
right to challenge the validity of the guilty 
plea on appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 
13,t 3, 40 P.3d 630, including any right to 
challenge the guilty plea on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See State 
v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392,ffi[ 7-8, 40 
P.3d 646. Because King failed to file a 
timely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, 
this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the 
claim that his guilty plea was not voluntary 
as a result of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. King also failed to respond to the 
State's motion for partial dismissal. 
Finally, the rule 23 B motion seeks a 
remand to enter findings of fact only on a 
claim that counsel was ineffective in 
representing King in connection with his 
guilty pleas.™1 Accordingly, because we 
dismiss appeal to the extent that it 
challenges the validity of the guilty pleas, 
we must also deny the rule 23 B motion. 
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FN1. Even if the merits of the 
motion were considered, it does not 
satisfy rule 23B's requirement to 
allege a nonspeculative allegation 
of facts and instead makes 
conclusory allegations that King 
seeks to support on remand. See 
Utah R.App. P. 23B(a); State v. 
Johnson, 2000 UT App 2905f 7, 
13 P.3d 175. 
We dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction only insofar as it raises issues 
challenging the validity of the guilty plea. 
The appeal shall continue as to the 
remaining issues related to sentencing. 
UtahApp.,2004. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 This case is before the court on 
Appellant Sione Latu's motion for remand 
pursuant to rule 23B of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and the State's cross 
motion for summary dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction pursuant to rule 10 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Latu pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery, 
reduced to a second degree felony. He was 
sentenced that same day. Latu then filed a 
notice of appeal. He did not, however, file 
a motion to withdraw his plea. The basis of 
Latu's motion to remand is that counsel for 
his plea did not inform Latu of the 
possibility of lesser offenses, including 
theft and assault. Also, Latu claims that 
counsel told him that he had no choice but 
to plead guilty because he would certainly 
be convicted of at least the second degree 
felony at trial. Latu submitted an affidavit 
in support of his claims. In his affidavit, 
Latu claims that he would not have pleaded 
guilty had he been aware of the lesser 
offenses. 
The State objected to remand and filed a 
cross motion for summary dismissal on the 
basis that this court lacks jurisdiction over 
the appeal because Latu failed to file a 
motion to withdraw his plea. See State v. 
Reyes, 2002 UT 13,1 5, 40 P.3d 630. The 
State claims that Latu's only remedy at this 
point is a post-conviction petition under 
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(c) (2003); 
UtahR.CivP.65C. 
Latu claims that denial of a direct appeal 
from the plea would result in violations of 
his constitutional rights. First, Latu 
contends that dismissal of his appeal 
would violate his right to due process. 
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Since the 2003 revision to Utah Code 
section 77-13-6, a motion to withdraw a 
plea must be made and ruled upon prior to 
imposition of sentence. The result, 
according to Latu, is to deprive defendants 
who plead and are sentenced on the same 
day of their direct appeal. 
The State responds that defendants who 
plead and are sentenced at the same time 
are not deprived of due process because 
they have a remedy in the form of a 
post-conviction petition. The State also 
contends that defendants who plead, give 
up many of their rights and significantly 
limits their right to appeal. Defendants are 
informed of this at the time the plea is 
taken. 
Latu claims that a post-conviction petition 
is inadequate because, in a petition, the 
appellant has the burden of persuasion. 
The State correctly counters that, in both a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea and in a 
direct appeal, the appellant also has the 
burden of persuasion. 
Second, Latu claims an equal protection 
violation. Specifically, the defendants who 
plead and are sentenced the same day are 
treated differently from those who plead 
and wait to be sentenced. The distinction, 
according to Latu, is not justified. The 
State argues that all defendants are 
required to move to withdraw their plea 
under Utah Code section 77-13-6, 
therefore, all are treated the same. 
Moreover, defendants who plead and are 
sentenced the same day do so at their own 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No CI 
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request. Therefore, any distinction is 
created by a defendant's own actions. 
*2 Third, Latu alleges a separation of 
powers violation. Latu, however, wholly 
fails to argue or provide this court with any 
analysis for this claim. 
Because Latu failed to file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, this court lacks 
jurisdiction over the appeal. Once this 
court has determined that it lacks 
jurisdiction, it "retains only the authority to 
dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac v. 
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989). As a result, this court also 
lacks jurisdiction to remand the matter 
pursuant to rule 23 B of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Accordingly, the motion for remand 
pursuant to rule 23B of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure is denied and the 
appeal is dismissed. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Connie Sue Lebow appeals her 
conviction on a drug charge after pleading 
guilty. This is before the court on Lebow's 
motion for a remand pursuant to Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 23B and on the 
State's motion for summary disposition 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
.),2006UTApp27 
based on lack of jurisdiction. 
Although Lebow pleaded guilty and seeks 
to attack that plea on appeal, albeit on a 
theory of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
she did not file a motion to withdraw her 
plea in the district court. Her failure to 
timely file a motion to withdraw her plea 
bars this court from considering her 
challenge to the validity of her plea on 
appeal. 
Pursuant to Utah Code section 77-13-6, a 
request to withdraw a guilty plea must be 
made by a motion filed prior to sentencing. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2003) 
. The failure to timely file a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea "extinguishes a 
defendant's right to challenge the validity 
of the guilty plea on appeal." State v. Reyes, 
2002 UT 13,1 3, 40 P.3d 630; see also, 
State v. Merrill 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 585 
(holding the time limit in section 77-13-6 
is jurisdictional). Absent a timely motion 
to withdraw a plea, appellate courts lack 
jurisdiction to consider any issue attacking 
the guilty plea itself, including whether a 
defendant received ineffective assistance 
of counsel in the plea agreement. See 
Merrill 2005 UT 34 at fflf 17-19; State 
v.. Melo, 2001 UT App 392, ffif 6-8, 40 
P.3d 646. Because Lebow failed to timely 
move to withdraw her guilty plea, this 
court lacks jurisdiction to consider her 
claim that she received ineffective 
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assistance of counsel in connection with 
her plea. Lebow has not raised any other 
issue that this court may review. 
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, based on 
the dismissal, Lebow's motion for remand 
is denied as moot. 
Utah App.,2006. 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK 
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Stephen Alfred MALLEN, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20050700-CA. 
Oct. 14, 2005. 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 
051902589. The Honorable Judith S. 
Atherton. 
Patrick S. Tan, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant. 
Before Judges BENCH, GREENWOOD, 
and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 Stephen Alfred Mallen appeals his 
conviction after entering a guilty plea. On 
appeal, he asserts his plea was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made and seeks 
to withdraw the plea. The appeal is before 
the court on its own motion for summary 
disposition due to the lack of a substantial 
question for review. 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
Page 1 
).), 2005 UT App 443 
Because Mallen did not make a timely 
motion to withdraw his plea below, he is 
precluded from challenging his plea on 
appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 
(2003); State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 3, 
40 P.3d 630. Section 77-13-6 provides that 
a defendant may move to withdraw a guilty 
plea only up to the time of sentencing. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b). The 
failure to timely move to withdraw a plea 
pursuant to section 77-13-6 "extinguishes a 
defendant's right to challenge the validity 
of the guilty plea on appeal." Reyes, 2002 
UT 13 at 1f3. 
This court lacks jurisdiction to address plea 
issues on appeal absent a timely motion to 
withdraw the plea. See id. As a result, this 
court cannot address Mallen's challenge to 
his guilty plea. Further, he raises no other 
issue for review. With no substantial issue 
for review, Mallen's conviction is 
summarily affirmed. 
UtahApp.,2005. 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK 
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David SOUSA, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 20030498-CA. 
Sept. 25,2003. 
Fourth District, Provo Department; The 
Honorable Fred D. Howard. 
Guy L. Black, Provo, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Laura B. Dupaix, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges JACKSON, GREENWOOD 
, and ORME. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Defendant David Sousa appeals from a 
district court order denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. The case is before 
the court on its own motion for summary 
affirmance. See Utah R.App. P. 10(e). We 
affirm. 
Defendant claims that the district court 
erred by denying his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea, which was based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, 
Defendant failed to file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea "within 30 days 
after the entry of the plea." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999). That failure " 
extinguished] [Defendant's] right to 
challenge the validity of the guilty plea on 
appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,1 3, 
40 P.3d 630, including his right to 
challenge the validity of the plea on the 
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
See State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392,ffi[ 
7-8, 40 P.3d 646. Therefore, the district 
court correctly concluded that it did not 
have jurisdiction to consider Defendant's 
ineffective assistance claim and correctly 
denied his motion to withdraw his plea. 
For the first time on appeal, Defendant 
claims that his counsel was ineffective 
because his counsel did not timely move to 
withdraw the plea. However, section 
77-13-6 does not permit this court, in this 
direct appeal, to extend the thirty-day 
period for filing a motion to withdraw a 
plea or, although that period has run, to set 
aside Defendant's plea because of post-plea 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See id.; 
Melo, 2001 UT App 392 at ^ 7-8. 
Defendant contends that not considering 
this ineffective assistance claim violates 
his right to seek redress from the courts. 
See Utah Const, art. I, § 11. That argument 
is unavailing given the availability of 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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redress by petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
In response to this court's motion for 
summary affirmance, Defendant claims 
that section 77-13-6 is unconstitutional as 
applied to him because he did not discover 
that he might be deported based on his plea 
until after the thirty-day period for filing a 
motion to withdraw his plea expired. 
However, although Defendant 
acknowledged that his motion to withdraw 
his plea was not timely, he did not raise the 
constitutionality of section 77-13-6 before 
the district court. This court will not 
consider issues, including constitutional 
issues, raised for the first time on appeal. 
See, e.g., State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 
920, 922 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
UtahApp.,2003. 
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